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2013 / A Smarter Rule for Smarter Phones
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In the same week Apple released its iPhone 4S, California Governor Jerry
Brown prevented the California Legislature from imposing limits on warrantless
2
searches of smartphones and left it with the judicial system. On October 9, 2011,
Brown vetoed Senate Bill (SB) 914, which would have prevented police officers
3
from searching an arrestee’s smartphone without a search warrant. Brown
reasoned that “[c]ourts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific
4
issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” The manner in
5
which California’s courts have handled the issue suggests otherwise.
For example, in California v. Nottoli, a Santa Cruz Sheriff’s Deputy stopped
6
Reid Nottoli for speeding early in the morning on December 6, 2009. The deputy
said Nottoli was nervous and sweating, appeared wide-awake, and had glassy and
7
bloodshot eyes that moved quickly. The deputy also noted the driver’s rapid
heartbeat, breathing, and speech—indications that Nottoli was under the
8
influence of a controlled substance. Even though Nottoli claimed he had
consumed caffeinated energy drinks, evidence of which was dispersed
9
throughout the car, the deputy believed Nottoli was intoxicated. The deputy
radioed in the stop and then called the watch commander, who informed the
10
deputy that Nottoli had been arrested for drug sales years ago.
After conducting a series of field sobriety tests, the deputy concluded Nottoli
was under the influence of a stimulant controlled substance and placed him under
11
arrest. During a subsequent search of Nottoli’s car, the deputy found drug
12
paraphernalia, a gun, and a cell phone. The deputy searched the cell phone for

1. Casey Newton, Apple’s iPhone 4S Generates Big 1st-Day Sales, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 2011, 3:17
PM), http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-10-15/business/30285202_1_unlimited-data-iphone-terry-stenzel (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
2. Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Jerry Brown Vetoes Bill Requiring Warrant to Search Cellphones, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/10/warrant-cellphone-tablet.html (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
3. David Kravets, Calif. Governor Allows Warrantless Cellphone Searches, WIRED MAG. (Oct. 10,
2011, 11:09 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
4. Orin Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:29 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/10/10/governor-brown-vetoes-bill-onsearching-cell-phones-incident-to-arrest/ [hereinafter Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing the development and rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court).
6. 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 891 (Ct. App. 2011).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 892.
12. Id. at 893.

364

04_COOPER_VER_01_7-13-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/29/2013 9:59 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
13

additional evidence of drug use. What he found was a photograph of two men
14
holding assault rifles, which are “difficult to obtain legally in California.”
Another officer also conducted a search of the photos, text messages, and e-mails
on Nottoli’s cell phone, finding additional evidence of illegal weapons and
15
marijuana cultivation. Subsequent tests revealed Nottoli was not under the
influence of stimulants, and prosecutors did not charge Nottoli for driving under
16
the influence. However, the original stop for speeding allowed the deputy to
search Nottoli’s cell phone, which led to the discovery of evidence of other
crimes—a search the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District in California upheld
17
as valid under the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine (SILA). Based on
evidence obtained from that cell phone search, prosecutors charged Nottoli with
possession of marijuana for sale, cultivation of marijuana, possession of a deadly
weapon, possession of a controlled substance, possession of an assault weapon,
18
possession of a destructive device, and possession of a blowgun.
The Nottoli court’s interpretation of California v. Diaz, which upheld a
19
warrantless search of a cell phone ninety-minutes after an arrest, expanded the
20
scope of searches under SILA. Now, law enforcement officers are able to search
through an arrestee’s cell phone for any evidence, even if the cell phone is not
21
related to the crime for which the suspect is arrested. Courts have expanded the
22
SILA doctrine to encompass cell phones by analogizing them to pagers, address
23
24
books, and cigarette packs. In the process, courts have not recognized the
greater invasion of privacy stemming from a SILA search of cell phones
25
compared to “analogous” items. As more Americans upgrade from basic cell
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 894.
16. Id. at 893–94. It should be noted that test results did show a presumptive positive for THC and
opiates. Id.
17. Id. at 907.
18. Id. at 889.
19. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL 4530138
(U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (denying a motion to suppress text messages retrieved from a cell phone as a search incident
to a lawful arrest in a case involving the sale of ecstasy).
20. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 907.
21. Kravets, supra note 3; see also Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 907 (finding “deputies had unqualified
authority . . . to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any container found therein”) (internal
citations omitted).
22. United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (analogizing a cell phone to a pager).
23. Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J.
1319, 1319–20 (2011) (“Government lawyers regularly claim that cell phones should be treated like ‘address
books’ because they share a functional role: aggregating contact information of friends and associates.”).
24. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 505–06 (upholding a warrantless search after finding the arrestee’s cell phone was
akin to the cigarette package in the defendant’s coat in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)—a case
in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search under SILA).
25. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329 (“While the iPhone is (arguably) functionally analogous to the
litigation bag (both are mobile containers which store documents), the doctrine’s application to iPhones
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26

27

phones to smartphones, evolving technology continues to advance beyond past
28
29
courts’ analogies. As cell phones become all-encompassing gadgets, the
30
California Legislature should step in where the California courts have not. The
California Legislature needs to enact a statute with enough concessions to satisfy
31
law enforcement unions and enough teeth to remove smartphones from SILA,
which has failed to protect the “wealth of private information” those devices now
32
have the ability to contain.
This Comment argues that the California Legislature should limit SILA to
exclude cell phones from these warrantless searches. It proposes a rule that
narrows warrantless searches of smartphones to situations where the suspect, or
his agents, may destroy or hide the evidence of the crime for which law
enforcement arrested the suspect. The search must be limited to the relevant areas
of the smartphone; and finally, law enforcement must treat a password-protected
33
cell phone like locked luggage.
exponentially increases the amount of private information obtainable by the government without cause or a
warrant.”).
26. See Jessica Dolcourt, Best Basic Phones, CNET (Sept. 4, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://reviews.
cnet.com/best-basic-phones/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), for an examination of basic cell phones
that include calling, texting, and picture features but do not access the Internet.
27. Brian Dolan, Study: 42 Percent of U.S. Uses a Smartphone, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://mobihealthnews.com/6178/study-42-percent-of-u-s-uses-a-smartphone/ (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (finding the percentage of U.S. consumers who owned a smartphone rose from fifteen percent in
October 2006 to forty-two percent by the end of 2009); see also Liane Cassavoy, What Makes a Smartphone
Smart?, http://cellphones.about.com/od/smartphonebasics/a/what_is_smart.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting smartphones’ abilities to use e-mail, connect to the Internet and
data networks, edit documents, and use an operating system that runs applications differentiates them from
traditional cell phones).
28. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1330 (finding that past precedents, when applied to emerging
technologies, eventually lose their usefulness with each subsequent comparison, leaving them “but faintly
recognizable in any of its alleged progeny”).
29. See Jared Newman, What Smartphones Will Be Like in 2012, PC WORLD (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/243590/what_smartphones_will_be_like_in_2012.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting the latest smartphones are equipped with better processors, higher-resolution
screens and cameras, and faster networks and will include the capability to wave the phone in front of a
payment kiosk instead of using a credit card); see also iPhone 4S Technical Specifications, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last accessed Nov. 10, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
30. See Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill, supra note 4 (“[L]egislatures have a major institutional
advantage over courts in this setting. They can better assess facts, more easily amend the law to reflect the latest
technology, are not stuck following precedents, can adopt more creative regulatory solutions, and can act
without a case or controversy. For these reasons, legislatures are much better equipped than courts to strike the
balance between security and privacy when technology is in flux.”).
31. See Kravets, supra note 3 (speculating that Governor Jerry Brown’s veto was aimed at pleasing law
enforcement unions that supported his campaign and opposed SB 914).
32. Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 200–01 (2010).
33. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1982) (suppressing evidence police obtained after conducting a warrantless search of a double-locked
footlocker).
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Part II details the ebb and flow of SILA, beginning with its modern adoption
34
in Chimel v. California as an exception to the general rule that warrantless
35
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This Part traces
how the United States Supreme Court expanded SILA from its original
justifications of police officer safety and evidence preservation, how the Court
has applied the exception to various objects, and how lower courts have
36
expanded SILA to encompass cell phones. Part III examines the types of items
to which courts have analogized cell phones while applying SILA, how
developing smartphone technology outpaces courts’ reasoning, and how the
judicial system has failed to protect the private information smartphones store.
Part III also argues the legislature is better equipped than the judicial system to
protect privacy rights in evolving technologies, and the ubiquitous use of
37
smartphones necessitates a forward-looking rule. Finally, Part IV summarizes
California Senator Mark Leno’s first attempt to protect cell phones from
warrantless searches and explains why it failed to satisfy Governor Brown and
the law enforcement unions that support the Governor. It proposes a modified
rule that would still protect smartphone users’ private data from warrantless
searches with enough concessions to satisfy the needs and concerns of law
enforcement officials.
II. FROM CHIMEL TO DIAZ: CHARTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SILA, BEGINNING
WITH COINS AND ENDING WITH CELL PHONES
Part A details the beginning of the modern SILA doctrine and the rationales
behind it and then traces SILA’s subsequent development. Part B examines the
U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to narrow SILA. Part C lays out the limited impact
of those attempts, while Part D outlines how courts have applied SILA to cell
phones.
A. The Development and Expansion of SILA
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the modern version of SILA in Chimel v.
38
California. In Chimel, the Court found it reasonable to allow officers to search
an arrestee and the area within the arrestee’s reach for weapons and evidence

34. 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (finding SILA was justified by a reasonable search for weapons and to
prevent the arrestee from hiding or destroying evidence).
35. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)).
36. See infra Part II.A–B (detailing the expansion of SILA).
37. See infra Part III.A–B (explaining why current rules have not adequately protected cell phones from
police search).
38. 395 U.S. at 763.
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39

without a warrant. The Court justified its interpretation of SILA with law
40
enforcement safety and preservation of evidence. In Chimel, the police obtained
41
an arrest warrant for the defendant following the burglary of a coin shop. When
the defendant arrived at his house, police arrested him and then conducted a
forty-five-minute search of his home—without a search warrant—going so far as
42
to search drawers in the defendant’s bedroom. The officers seized a number of
43
coins, medals, and tokens that the prosecution used at trial. The Court held that
absent the constitutional justifications of officer safety or evidence preservation,
a warrantless search, like the one in Chimel, resembled the general warrant
44
searches the Fourth Amendment aimed to eradicate; therefore, this search could
45
not be justified under SILA.
The Court’s initial conception of SILA remained consistent with the
principle of “particular justification,” which requires officers to obtain a search
warrant under the Fourth Amendment before searching a person or place, subject
46
to narrowly tailored exceptions. The government must justify warrantless
searches in each case, and the scope must be limited to the government’s
47
particular need for the search. Therefore, when the government attempts to
apply a warrant exception to a new set of facts, the exception must narrowly
48
serve the original justifications for the exception. Chimel’s version of SILA
49
addressed the needs of evidence preservation and officer safety. In theory, any

39. Id.
40. Id. at 762–63.
41. Id. at 753.
42. Id. at 753–54.
43. Id.
44. A general warrant traditionally gave law enforcement officers “broad discretion or authority to
search and seize unspecified places or persons. A general warrant lacks a sufficiently particularized description
of the person or thing to be seized or the place to be searched. General warrants are unconstitutional because
they do not meet the Fourth Amendment’s specificity requirements.” General Warrant Law & Legal Definition,
USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/g/general-warrant/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
45. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 767–68 (citing United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926)).
Some other exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant include the emergency doctrine, consent, and
third-party exposure. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (concerning
an exception for information exposed to a third party); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.1(b) (5th
ed. 2012). The emergency doctrine allows a warrantless search where getting a warrant would result in losing
the evidence. Id. A person also can lose her Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy by exposing information
to third parties, thus eliminating the warrant requirement. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957. Closely related to the thirdparty exception, a person also can consent to a search, thus waiving the warrant requirement. 2 LaFave, supra, §
4.1(b).
46. Catherine Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085,
1095–96 (1982).
47. Id.
48. Douglas M. Smith, Comment, Ohio v. Robinette: Per Se Unreasonable, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 897,
900 (1998).
49. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
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subsequent application of SILA should be limited to those twin aims. However,
as the next section shows, the Court has not tethered subsequent applications of
51
SILA to those original government needs.
1. Moving Away from Chimel’s Original Justifications
Four years after Chimel, the Court expanded SILA to permit warrantless
searches of closed containers on an arrestee’s person and expanded its rationale
52
for permitting warrantless SILA searches by using a reasonableness standard. In
United States v. Robinson, the Court held that an officer’s search of the cigarette
pack the officer found in the arrestee’s jacket pocket, turning up fourteen
53
capsules of heroin, passed constitutional muster. The Court created a bright-line
rule, holding that a search of an arrestee’s person was “reasonable” and thus did
54
not require the original justifications from Chimel.
55
United States v. Edwards relaxed the temporal requirement that a SILA
56
search be contemporaneous with the arrest. The Edwards Court held that items
immediately associated with an arrestee’s person can be searched “even though a
57
substantial period of time has elapsed” between the arrest and search. Edwards
allowed lower courts to uphold warrantless searches of arrestees’ cell phones

50. Id.
51. Justin M. Wolcott, Are Smartphones Like Footlockers or Crumpled Up Cigarette Packages?
Applying the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine to Smartphones in South Carolina Courts, 61 S.C. L. REV. 843,
845–47 (2010).
52. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–37 (1973).
53. Id. at 235.
54. Id.
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Wolcott, supra note 51, at 846 (finding that Robinson “eroded Fourth
Amendment protections” the Court created in Chimel).
55. 415 U.S. 800, 808 (1974).
56. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 753, 764 (1969) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964)).
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons
and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need
to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the
weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control. But these
justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest.
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
57. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 807. “Immediate possession” means property within the arrestee’s immediate
possession—essentially what a person carries with him or her when moving from one place to another. Id. at
803–04.
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well after their arrests, meaning neither the contemporaneous requirement nor the
58
twin justifications of SILA were present during the subsequent searches.
The Court did limit the reach of SILA in United States v. Chadwick, holding
that once officers have exclusive possession over luggage or other personal
property not “immediately associated with [a] person,” the search is “no longer
59
an incident of the arrest.” Chadwick involved a footlocker that law enforcement
60
officials seized during an arrest and searched ninety-minutes later. The Court
found the search was “remote in time or place from the arrest” and, therefore,
61
invalid under SILA. But after Chadwick’s narrow approach to SILA, limited by
Chimel’s twin justifications of evidence preservation and officer safety, the Court
once again strayed from in subsequent decisions premised on a general
62
reasonableness analysis of the search.
2. The Court Finding SILA More Reasonable
63

After Chadwick restricted Robinson, the Court wandered even further away
64
from the principle of particular justification used in Chimel. New York v.
65
Belton played a central role in that departure. Belton began with a traffic stop
66
for speeding. The officer smelled burnt marijuana and spotted an envelope he
67
believed contained more of the drug. The officer placed the vehicle’s four
occupants under arrest and ordered them to stand separate from one another
68
outside of the vehicle. The officer then searched the car and discovered cocaine
69
in the pocket of a leather jacket. Despite the fact the suspects were under arrest,
standing away from the vehicle, and could not have reached the jacket, the Court
found that the passenger compartment of an automobile was within the area an
70
arrestee could reach. Citing Robinson and striving to create an easy-to-apply
rule, the Court sacrificed Chimel’s twin justifications for a reasonableness

58. See infra Part II.D.1 (reviewing cases in which courts used SILA to uphold warrantless searches of
cell phones).
59. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565 (1991).
60. Id. at 3–5.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part II.A.2 (detailing the Supreme Court’s finding SILA more reasonable).
63. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15.
64. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (holding the twin justifications for SILA are
officer safety and evidence preservation).
65. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
66. Id. at 455.
67. Id. at 455–56.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 459–60.
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analysis by allowing warrantless searches of an arrestee’s automobile and any
71
containers found within.
Two decades later, in Thorton v. United States, the Court extended Belton to
permit an officer to search a vehicle when an arrestee was a “recent occupant” of
72
the vehicle. The Court validated a warrantless search of an automobile where
the officer confronted and arrested the defendant after the defendant exited his
73
car. While concurring in the judgment in Thornton, Justice Scalia noted that
Belton could not be explained as a direct application of Chimel and involved a
74
much broader interpretation of SILA. Justice Scalia advocated limiting Belton’s
broad holding to searches where an officer reasonably believed “evidence
75
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Despite Justice
Scalia’s approach and Chimel’s justifications for SILA, with the broad holdings
of Robinson, Belton, and Thornton, lower courts “have taken a broad approach
and upheld searches of numerous small containers incident to arrest” and “not
hesitated to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine in new situations
76
unforeseen by the Supreme Court.”
B. An Attempt to Return to the Twin Justifications of Chimel
In Arizona v. Gant, the Court attempted to clarify the approach to SILA
77
established by Chimel and Belton. There, an officer arrested the defendant for
78
driving with a suspended license. While the arrestee sat in the back of a police
79
car, the officer searched the arrestee’s car and located cocaine. The Court noted
that lower courts’ and police academies’ broad reading of Belton allowed a
warrantless search of an automobile regardless of the reason for the arrest and
80
81
whether he had access to the vehicle. Justice Stevens’ majority opinion took a
narrow view of Belton, however, and held that a warrantless search of a vehicle
71. Id. at 459 (noting that a search under Robinson not only fit within a Fourth Amendment exception
but was also a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment).
72. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 618, 623–24.
74. Id. at 631–32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 632.
76. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 35–36
(2008).
77. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
78. Id. at 335.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 341–42, 344.
81. Justice Scalia concurred, creating a five-Justice majority. However, Justice Scalia also advocated
abandoning the Belton-Thornton line of cases and allowing a SILA search of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle only where the officer had reason to believe evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested
would be found in the automobile. Justice Scalia noted he could not command a majority to overrule Belton and
Thornton, so he concurred with Justice Stevens’ rule, finding it the lesser of two evils, to at least narrow SILA’s
application. Id. at 335.
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incident to a lawful arrest was constitutional only when “an arrestee is within
reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
82
evidence of the offense of arrest.” The Court expressed concern with a rule that
allowed officers to search any container in an automobile even when the
83
arrestable offense was merely a traffic violation. The Gant Court held the search
unreasonable, and explained that when an arrest involves a traffic violation, it is
not reasonable for officers to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of that
84
offense.
To counter the lower courts’ broad application of Belton, Gant seemingly
reattached SILA to Chimel’s justifications of evidence preservation and officer
85
safety, as opposed to the reasonableness analysis that seemed to permeate the
86
Supreme Court’s expansion of SILA. And if Gant applies broadly, then the
analogies courts have drawn between the cigarette package in Robinson and the
footlocker in Chadwick to determine whether the search of the item is valid under
SILA become irrelevant once the defendant is secured and the item (for our
87
purposes, a cell phone) does not involve evidence relating to the arrest.
C. Gant’s Limited Impact
Even absent such an exigency, lower courts, at least in the context of cell
88
phones, have cabined Gant’s holding to SILA searches of automobiles, meaning
the analogies drawn between Robinson and Chadwick remain relevant in

82. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 344.
84. Id.
85. Orso, supra note 32, at 208–09 (arguing that Gant’s limited holding should apply in non-vehicle
contexts, as well).
86. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (finding that an arrest with probable cause
is a reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; therefore, a SILA search “requires no additional justification”);
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding the passenger compartment of a vehicle to be “within
the arrestee’s immediate control” for the purposes of a SILA search even when the arrestee is no longer in the
car); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (extending a bright line rule that allows a SILA
search of a vehicle if the arrestee was merely “[a] recent occupant” of the vehicle).
87. Orso, supra note 32, at 208–09.
88. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507 n.9 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (U.S. 2011)
(finding Gant was not relevant because it involved a search of an area within the immediate control of an
arrestee, not a search of the arrestee’s person); Smallwood v. Florida, 61 So. 3d 448, 452–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (finding Gant, on which defendant relied for appeal, inapplicable to a search of appellant’s person,
though the court noted it shared the same privacy concerns as Gant); United States v. Hill, No. CR 10-00261
JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding the rule in Robinson to apply to a warrantless
search of arrestee’s iPhone, not Gant, because the phone was in the defendant’s pocket); Fawdry v. Florida, 70
So. 3d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that Gant was not relevant because the search took place in
a home, not a vehicle, and the defendant was carrying the cell phone on his person); see also United States v.
Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 713 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that other circuits were divided over whether Gant was limited
to vehicular searches but declining to answer the question, holding a search of arrestee’s cell phone was valid
under the good-faith exception of the exclusionary rule instead).
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practice. However, Belton allows officers to consider anything, including
containers, inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle to be within the scope
of the rule in Robinson, regardless of whether the arrestee can actually reach the
89
item. Since the majority of SILA searches of cell phones occur in the context of
90
a vehicle stop, a broad reading of Belton, coupled with a narrow reading of
Gant, renders the distinction between Chadwick and Robinson irrelevant in an
91
automobile context.
92
California v. Nottoli illustrates this point. After the defendant was
handcuffed and placed in the police car, the officer found the arrestee’s cell
93
phone in the car’s cup holder. The California appellate court stated Gant left the
94
scope of a Belton search unchanged and found officers had authority under the
U.S. Supreme Court’s SILA precedents to search the defendant’s car and any
95
containers therein. The California court found that Gant still empowered
officers with the broad search power of Belton, if the officers reasonably believed
96
evidence might be found in the vehicle (not necessarily the cell phone).
In Notolli, the defendant was pulled over for speeding; he never was charged
with driving under the influence; the energy drinks in the vehicle explained the
defendant’s level of alertness; he was not carrying the cell phone on his person;
and he was in the back of a police car when police seized and searched his
97
phone. Even then, the California appellate court still found these circumstances
98
within the limits of Robinson and Gant. Thus, the court allowed police to search
the cell phone of a person arrested for driving on an expired license without a
99
warrant even though, as Justice Stevens noted in Gant, police cannot “expect to
100
find evidence in the passenger compartment” of such an offense.
While some commentators thought Gant would require courts to offer more
101
protection to cell phones from warrantless searches, the trend among courts has
102
been the opposite. The California Supreme Court continued the departure from

89. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
90. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347, 351 (2009).
91. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 898–900 (Ct. App. 2011).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 892–93.
94. Id. at 904.
95. Id. at 904–05.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 890–93.
98. Id. at 904–05.
99. Id. at 892.
100. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009). In Nottoli, police later admitted the arrestee “was not
sufficiently impaired to require involvement of” the California Highway Patrol and “was not arrested for
driving under the influence.” Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 893.
101. Orso, supra note 32, at 208–09.
102. See infra Part II.D.1 (reviewing cases in which courts used SILA to uphold warrantless searches of
cell phones).
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Chimel’s original justifications in Diaz. The court in Diaz upheld a warrantless
search of the defendant’s cell phone ninety-minutes after his arrest for
104
participating in an ecstasy buy. After initially questioning the defendant,
officers searched his cell phone for text messages related to the buy and then
105
confronted the defendant with those texts to elicit a confession. The Notolli
court followed suit by allowing a search of a cell phone when there was no
possibility the phone contained evidence related to the arrestee’s expired
106
license. Thus, both the Diaz and Notolli courts demonstrated that Gant’s impact
on California courts is minimal, and lower courts in other states have similar
107
narrowed Gant’s limitation on SILA searches of cell phones.
D. SILA Applied to Cell Phones
The first section details the cases, and the reasoning behind them, that found
warrantless searches of cell phones valid, while the second section surveys courts
that did not uphold warrantless searches of cell phones.
1. Warrantless Searches Found Valid
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied SILA to a case involving a
108
109
cell phone, the supreme courts of California and Ohio and two federal
110
circuits have weighed in on the matter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit addressed the topic first in United States v. Finley, a case involving a
warrantless search of the defendant’s cell phone after a controlled
111
methamphetamine buy. The suspect participated in a sale of methamphetamine
to a police source at a truck stop and then was pulled over after leaving the
112
113
scene. Police arrested the suspect and seized his cell phone. DEA agents later
searched the cell phone while questioning the defendant at a separate location
114
115
and found texts and call records related to the drug sale. Citing Robinson and
103. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
104. Id. at 502–03.
105. Id.
106. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 890–93 (Ct. App. 2011).
107. See infra Part II.D.1 (reviewing cases in which courts used SILA to uphold warrantless searches of
cell phones).
108. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 501.
109. Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010).
110. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2016 (2009); United
States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
111. 477 F.3d at 253.
112. Id. at 253–54.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)) (upholding a warrantless
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United States v. Ortiz, which upheld a warrantless search of a pager, the Fifth
117
Circuit upheld the search of the cell phone under SILA. The approach
(analogizing to a pager) and result (upholding a warrantless search) of the Fifth
Circuit is one that most lower courts have followed in subsequent cases involving
118
warrantless searches of cell phones.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Murphy,
upheld the warrantless searches of three defendants’ cell phones following a
traffic stop that turned up cocaine, counterfeit currency, fakes IDs, and nearly
119
$15,000. The law enforcement officers did not search the seized cell phones
until they returned to a DEA office, at which point they discovered text messages
120
identifying one of the arrestees as a drug supplier. In upholding the search, the
Fourth Circuit declined to delineate between simple cell phones and those with
121
large storage capacity and functionality.
122
Diaz came next, also a case involving the alleged sale of drugs. The
123
arrestee drove a co-defendant to buy ecstasy. Officers did not search the
arrestee’s cell phone until they transported the defendant back to the sheriff’s
124
station—ninety-minutes after the initial arrest. The arrestee admitted his role in
125
the sale when shown his incriminating text messages. In upholding the search,
the Supreme Court of California utilized a bright-line rule for SILA searches of
126
cell phones immediately associated with the arrestee’s person, like the cigarette
127
pack in Robinson. The California Supreme Court found cell phone searches
valid under the Fourth Amendment even if they do not fit within the original
128
justifications of the SILA exception. The Court rejected arguments that the
scope of a SILA search should be tailored to the nature of the object searched or
that a search of a cell phone should be distinguished from a search of a cell

search of a cigarette package).
116. 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996).
117. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260.
118. Orso, supra note 32, at 203.
119. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 407–09 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2016
(2009).
120. Id. at 409.
121. Id. at 411–12.
122. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
123. Id. at 502.
124. Id. at 502–03.
125. Id. at 503.
126. Id. at 509.
127. Id.
128. Id. (noting the Robinson Court adopted the “straightforward, easily applied, and predictably
enforced rule that a full [warrantless] search of the person is constitutionally permissible, and [rejected] the
suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the
reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
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phone’s contents. Citing Robinson, the Court noted “a ‘lawful custodial arrest
justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have’ in
130
property immediately associated with his or her person at the time of arrest.”
Finally, in response to the defendant’s and dissenting judge’s argument that
developing cell phone technology necessitated a new rule, the majority stated,
“[i]f, as the dissent asserts, the wisdom of the high court’s decision ‘must be
newly evaluated’ in light of modern technology . . . then that reevaluation must
131
be undertaken by the high court itself.” The U.S. Supreme Court denied
132
certiorari in Murphy and Diaz. The lower courts that followed suit in upholding
cell phone searches pursuant to SILA—especially in drug cases—are
133
numerous.
2. Warrantless Searches Found Invalid
Not every court agrees with the bright-line approach to SILA and cell
phones, and two notable decisions have attempted to narrow the reach SILA has
134
in the area of cell phones. In United States v. Park, police surveillance of an
indoor marijuana cultivation operation led to the arrest of the defendants and
135
warrantless searches of their cell phones at the police station. The Park court
found that this type of warrantless search did not fit within the original SILA
136
justifications. Thus, the court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s adoption in
Finley of a bright-line rule regarding cell phones associated with an arrestee’s
137
person. Park held that the vast amount of information cell phones contain
necessitates treating them like a container within an arrestee’s immediate control,
like in Chadwick; therefore, once police have exclusive control over a cell phone,
138
officers need a warrant to search that phone.
Ohio v. Smith also involved an arrest for drug dealing and a search of the
139
defendant’s cell phone at the police station. Like the Park court, the Supreme
Court of Ohio found that the purposes of the officer’s search did not fit within the
140
traditional justifications of SILA. However, these cases are outliers, and the
129. Id. at 508.
130. Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
131. Id. at 511 (internal quotations omitted).
132. Diaz v. California, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011); Murphy v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2016 (2009).
133. See Orso, supra note 32, at 203 (citing numerous cases to support the assertion that a majority of
lower courts have upheld SILA searches of arrestee’s cell phones).
134. Infra notes 135–40.
135. No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
136. Id. at *8–9.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *9.
139. 920 N.E.2d 949, 950–51 (Ohio 2009).
140. Id. at 955; see also United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22,
2008), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding a text message on a cell phone is akin to a sealed letter,
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majority of lower courts have had little trouble analogizing traditional SILA
141
searches to the modern world of cell phones.
E. How Gant’s Holding Applies to Smartphones with Remote-Wipe Programs
New exigencies associated with emerging technologies could further justify
142
warrantless searches of an arrestee’s smartphone —even under Gant’s
143
narrowing of SILA. Users can now equip their smartphones with remote-wipe
programs that allow someone to send a signal to the phone from a computer,
144
prompting the device to erase all of its data. Because one of the original
145
rationales of SILA is the preservation of evidence, the threat of remotely
erasing a phone still would be present when police take a person into custody.
Indeed, at least one court has upheld a search of a cell phone based on officers’
146
fears that a phone’s contents might be erased. However, police can disable this
function by turning off the phone, placing it in a container that blocks the signal,
147
or removing the battery, thus negating the exigency. Therefore, police should
still have to obtain a warrant to search a smartphone in most situations under a
148
149
broad reading of Gant, but that has not always been the case in practice. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently accepted this exigency
argument in United States v. Flores-Lopez in allowing a warrantless search of a
150
cell phone to retrieve its number.
requiring a warrant); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (finding a
warrantless search of a cell phone to be invalid because the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended
license and the search was for drug-related evidence).
141. Orso, supra note 32, at 203.
142. Infra notes 134–40 (examining how officers could still search cell phones under Gant’s holding).
143. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 344, 351–52 (2009).
144. Jamie Lendino, How to Remotely Disable Your Lost or Stolen Phone, PCMAG (Apr. 12, 2012),
http://www.pcmag.com/ article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp#fbid=ehwTo0NI8Qw (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); see also Ben Grubb, Remote Wiping Thwarts Secret Service, ZDNET (May 18, 2010, 4:43 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com.au/remote-wiping-thwarts-secret-service-339303239.htm (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (detailing how accomplices of arrestees can remotely erase the arrestee’s seized cell phone).
145. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
146. United States v. Young, Nos. 05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667, at *13 (N.D. W.V. May 9, 2006)
(finding that the cell phone could be set to erase text messages in a case involving heroin trafficking, thus
creating a sufficient exigency to support a warrantless search of the phone); see also United States v. Zamora,
No. 1:05 CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (upholding a warrantless search in a
case involving the manufacture of methamphetamine because the phone might be enabled to erase the incoming
call log periodically and officers could not determine if the function was turned on and would kick in before
police could obtain a warrant).
147. Grubb, supra note 144.
148. Orso, supra note 32, at 208 (arguing that if lower courts apply Gant generally, a warrantless search
of an arrestee’s cell phone would be invalid once officers secured the arrestee out of reach of her cell phone).
149. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F. 3d 803, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2012).
150. Id. (“We said it was conceivable, not probable, that a confederate of the defendant would have
wiped the data from the defendant’s cell phone before the government could obtain a search warrant; and it
could be argued that the risk of destruction of evidence was indeed so slight as to be outweighed by the invasion
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III. HOW COURTS HAVE FAILED TO PROTECT PRIVACY
INTERESTS IN CELL PHONES
This section analyzes the progression courts have followed to apply SILA to
cell phones. It then details how the reasoning has broken down in the smartphone
context and why legislatures, not courts, are better suited to adapt search-andseizure rules to emerging technologies.
A. The Analogies that Bring SILA and Cell Phones Together
Analogizing is a necessity for legal reasoning, especially as courts attempt to
fashion precedent to new technologies that old rules did not originally
151
conceptualize. While necessary, the process is far from fail proof as courts have
152
struggled to grasp the purpose and development of new technologies. Problems
arise when a court finds that an object traditionally covered by a rule has
something in common with a new technology, and the court then creates another
153
functional category under that rule for the new technology. As courts continue
to create additional categories based on finding one or two traits in common, they
eventually “deviate over time (and often subconsciously) from the intended arc
of precedent” through the use of what one commentator calls “mono-logical
154
reasoning.”
In a cell phone context, one can trace a line from Robinson’s cigarette
155
package to modern defendants’ cell phones to illustrate the point. After the
Robinson Court found the warrantless search of a cigarette pack valid under
156
SILA, subsequent courts upheld searches of various other items located in
157
158
159
160
arrestees’ pockets like wallets, address books, diaries, day planners,

of privacy from the search.”).
151. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1323.
152. See City of Richmond v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 U.S. 761, 773 (1899) (citing a number of
courts that found telephone communications to be the same as telegraph communications and thus regulated by
the same laws); see also Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244–45 (1915) (finding
movies to be mere entertaining pictures made for profit, not deserving of First Amendment protection);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding that because wire taps did not involve a physical
trespass, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
153. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329–30.
154. Id. (noting that over time, this type of reasoning creates an “‘operator’ effect: where the essence of
past decisions is but faintly recognizable in any of its alleged progeny”).
155. See infra notes 156–63 (detailing how courts have applied SILA to different scenarios).
156. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
157. United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1346–47 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that Robinson stood for
the proposition that a SILA search encompasses personal property found in an arrestee’s pockets and citing
numerous cases that reached the same conclusion).
158. United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding the photocopying of the
defendant’s address book to be permissible in the absence of a warrant).
159. United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1967).
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162

purses, and pagers. All of those items were personal property associated with
a person and could contain similar types of private information—a parallel that
allowed the courts to make short, logical jumps from one item to the next. When
cell phone cases made their way into courts, judges had ample precedent to bring
163
cell phones into the SILA fold.
However, this type of reasoning breaks down when courts fail to consider the
164
relevant differences between objects. As one commentator noted:
(1) Litigation bags have certain functions X, Y, and Z; (2) iPhones differ
functionally from litigation bags (for instance, they offer functions A and
B) but share functions X, Y, and Z; (3) The law permits warrantless
searches of litigation bags found within an arrestee’s grab area; (4)
Because iPhones share functions X, Y, and Z with litigation bags, the
law should permit warrantless searches of iPhones found within an
165
arrestee’s grab area.
This type of thinking focuses on similarities while failing to consider the
greater amount of information cell phones store and the number of people who
166
use them. As Justice Sotomayor discussed in her concurring opinion in United
States v. Jones, the traditional rule that a person loses a Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy in data exposed to third parties is “ill suited to the digital
167
age.” Justice Sotomayor opined that the amount of information users convey to
their cell phone companies and Internet providers should cause the Court to step
168
back and reconsider its disclosure rule in the future. In a similar vein, one
commentator proposes that courts need to recognize that their analogies
breakdown in situations where the extractable information from the new
169
technology far exceeds that contained in the object creating the precedent.
When the analogy breaks down, courts should undertake a “fresh analysis” of the
170
emerging technology.

160. United States v. Vaneenwyk, 206 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
161. United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1970).
162. United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Chan, 830 F.
Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that while a person has an expectation of privacy in a pager, an
arrestee loses that expectation during a valid exercise of police officers’ SILA power).
163. See United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding no way to
distinguish a cell phone from a wallet or address book); see also United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th
Cir. 2007) (comparing cell phones to valid, warrantless searches of pagers).
164. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning Commentary, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 746 (1993).
165. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329.
166. Id. at 1329–30.
167. 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1335.
170. Id.
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One can see this type of approach under the Fourth Amendment in the
171
context of thermal imaging scans, addressed in Kyllo v. United States. Prior to
Kyllo, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed surveillance of a home so long as the
portion of the house police observed was in plain view and officers were not
172
trespassing. The Court then upheld enhanced aerial photographs of an industrial
173
174
complex and standard photographs of a defendant’s backyard, noting that
“[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
175
and technology afforded them . . . .” Lower courts had also upheld warrantless
176
177
surveillance with the aid of a flashlight or binoculars.
Logically, the facts of Kyllo—observation of the outside of a home, using a
178
thermal imaging device, where the officer was standing in a public place —
would seem a natural extension of permissible observation under Fourth
Amendment precedent from the use of cameras, flashlights, and binoculars to
179
180
thermal imaging scanners. Indeed, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
181
182
183
184
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits found a thermal scan of a
home did not constitute a search.
However, Justice Scalia noted that the technological advances diminished the
Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections and, while the scan in Kyllo was crude
and did not compromise the defendant’s privacy in this specific case, the Court
needed a forward-looking rule to cover “more sophisticated systems” that were
185
sure to follow.
171. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
172. California v. Ciraolo, 467 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection of the home
has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his
activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which
renders the activities clearly visible.”).
173. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
174. Ciraolo, 467 U.S. at 214–15.
175. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
176. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (holding that looking into a barn with the aid of a
flashlight was not a search); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (finding that using a flashlight to look into a
car was not a search).
177. United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978); Fullbright v. United States, 392
F.2d 432, 434 (10th Cir. 1968).
178. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001).
179. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing the search in Kyllo was valid because it only involved
“nothing more than off-the-wall surveillance by law enforcement officers to gather information exposed to the
general public from the outside of petitioner’s home”).
180. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
181. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
182. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
183. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
184. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995).
185. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34, 36, 40.
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Justice Scalia could have found that thermal imaging scans and aerial
photography each involved using technology to take a picture of the outside of a
building that is within public view (similarities of X and Y in the previous
186
example), ignored the differences in what each type of surveillance actually
187
revealed (differences A and B), and added thermal imaging as a category of
surveillance that is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Instead, Justice Scalia acknowledged that thermal imaging scans are much more
intrusive because they actually reveal what is happening inside the home—
information that could not be attained from simply looking at a house from the
188
street. Because thermal imaging invaded the homeowner’s privacy in a way
189
that aerial surveillance did not, Justice Scalia undertook a “fresh analysis” of an
190
emerging technology, creating a new rule to govern thermal imaging.
Recently, in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor also acknowledged
that traditional rules finding no expectation of privacy in data voluntarily
disclosed to third parties also should be re-examined because people now expose
a large amount of information to third parties during the course of day-to-day
191
tasks. Because our electronic devises transmit far more information about us
than they did in the past (Internet browsing history, cell phones that show our
location and movement, medications purchased online, et cetera), Justice
Sotomayor suggested the old rules developed in an era of rotary phones no longer
192
comport with the modern age. While Jones dealt with GPS tracking devices,
Sotomayor’s logic applies to smartphones as well, furthering the argument that
193
old rules often do not adequately cover rapidly developing technologies.
B. Where Courts Have Come Up Short
Kyllo’s approach is useful when analyzing the issue of SILA searches and
smartphones. While the majority of SILA cell phone cases involved older phones
194
with rudimentary functions like call logs, contact lists, and text messages,

186. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329.
187. Id.
188. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
189. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1335.
190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that when the government “uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”).
191. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provided
the deciding vote for the five-justice majority, joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, along with Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kennedy.).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011) (involving
text messages); Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (involving
a search of call records and phone numbers); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106–07 (D. Mass.
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smartphones have become all-encompassing gadgets. Today, a smartphone
contains text messages, e-mail, Internet, photos, video, calendars, social
networking, music, movies, GPS navigation, barcode readers, applications for
196
virtually anything, and, of course, a telephone feature. Smartphones also now
197
function as credit cards that users can swipe in front of a kiosk to pay a bill.
198
199
They can turn off the lights in one’s house, unlock one’s car remotely, or
200
even monitor one’s blood pressure. The only limit to smartphones’ capabilities
seems to be the imagination of their manufacturers.
201
Kyllo and the previous discussion of analogical reasoning provide an
202
analytical framework for the ever-expanding capabilities of smartphones.
203
Smartphones are like wallets in that they can contain documents like receipts,

2009) (involving a search of the call records and caller ID); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir.
2007) (involving a search of call records and text messages); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007
WL 1521573, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (looking through a contact list); Hawkins v. Georgia, 704 S.E.2d
886 (Ga. App. 2010) (involving a search of text messages).
195. See generally Newman, supra note 29 (noting the newest smart phones will be faster, with better
screens and cameras and will include the capability to wave the phone in front of a payment kiosk instead of
using a credit card); see also APPLE, supra note 29.
196. Amanda Gornot, What Are the Functions of a Smart Phone?, EHOW, http://www.ehow.
com/info_8068722_ functions-smartphone.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); How to Choose the Best Smart Phone Navigation App, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 21, 2011, 3:30
PM), http://news.consumerreports.org/cars/2011/12/how-to-choose-the-best-smart-phone-navigation-app.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
197. Jared Newman, Beyond Google Wallet: A Look at the Competition, PC WORLD (Sept. 19, 2011,
2:27 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/240261/beyond_google_wallet_a_look_at_the_competition.html (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (looking at the competition Google Wallet faces in the market as Visa,
Apple, and Isis develop their own smart phone payment programs).
198. Throw Out Your Remotes, BLACKBERRY, http://www.blackberry.com/newsletters/connection/
personal/i509/remotes.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
199. Remotely Unlock and Start Your Car – Coming Soon to a Smartphone Near You, INDEPENDENT
(LONDON) (July 23, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/motoring/remotely-unlock-and-start-yourcar--coming-soon-to-a-smartphone-near-you-2033987.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
200. Troy Wolverton, Smart Phone Functions Seep into All Sectors, PHYSORG (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-01-smart-functions-seep-sectors.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
201. See supra Part III.A (explaining how monological reasoning allowed courts to bring emerging
technologies under the umbrella of SILA).
202. See Chris Morris, 5 Cool Features of the Next Wave of Smart Phones, YAHOO! PLUGGED IN (Oct.
20, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://games.yahoo.com/blogs/plugged-in/5-cool-features-next-wave-smart-phones000041688.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing smart phones with flexible screens and
augmented reality features that allow people to move with the phone to correspond to moving in a video game
being used on the phone); see also Ginny Miles, Quad-Core Phones: What to Expect in 2012, PC WORLD (Dec.
11, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/246011/quadcore_phones_what_to_expect_in_2012.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the upcoming advances in the 2012 batch of smart
phones).
203. Matt Skaggs, Smartphones That Allow You to Work Excel Documents, SALON, http://techtips.
salon.com/smartphones-allow-work-excel-documents-3493.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (detailing which types of smart phones run Microsoft Office, which includes Excel
documents).
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205

pictures, and, now, credit cards. Smartphones are like address books in that
206
they contain contact information. Smartphones are like pagers in that they
207
transmit electronic messages and phone numbers. But, while sufficient
similarities exist to monologically compare smartphones to categories of items
previously encompassed by SILA, the amount of private data contained in a
208
smartphone—like the details of the home revealed by a thermal scan in Kyllo —
209
greatly exceeds those other items. Therefore, courts should analyze warrantless
210
searches of cell phones in general—and smartphones in particular—differently.
Unfortunately, many courts have not protected privacy interests in new
211
212
technology, of which Nottoli is the latest chapter.
C. Judicial Entrenchment
Some commentators argue that courts are best situated to protect privacy
interests in new technology, with cases like Kyllo standing as examples of how
213
courts can use the Fourth Amendment to craft technology-specific rules. These
commentators argue that if drafting rules for new technologies is left to the
legislature, those rules could reflect the will of the majority, rather than the
214
constitutional values the Framers adopted to protect privacy. This perspective
places its faith in judicial activism to apply these constitutional values to

204. EHOW, supra note 196.
205. Justine Rivero, No Plastic Needed: Consumers and the Future of Mobile Payments, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/justine-rivero/mobile-payment-technology_b_
988133.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
206. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1320; see also Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 40 (noting that courts have
had little trouble analogizing cell phones to address books or envelopes).
207. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1324–26; see also United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir.
2007).
208. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
209. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1329; see also Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 40–42 (arguing that valid
warrantless searches of iPhones raise concerns because iPhones store vast amounts of data compared even to
traditional cell phones in addition to information accessible on smartphones through the Internet that is stored
remotely).
210. Milligan, supra note 23, at 1335.
211. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies] (“[C]ourts rarely accept claims to Fourth Amendment protection in new technologies that do not
involve interference with property rights, and have rejected broad claims to privacy in developing technologies
with surprising consistency. The result is a critical gap between privacy rules the modern Fourth Amendment
provides and privacy rules needed to effectively regulate government use of developing technologies.”).
212. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 891, 907 (Ct. App. 2011).
213. See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 857 (attributing this
view to those with a broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment).
214. Id. at 858 (“Because the Fourth Amendment reflects a clear commitment of the Framers to protect
privacy, judges should identify the values of privacy in new technologies and translate them in to new Fourth
Amendment rules.”).
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developing technologies. However, in practice the courts have been far more
216
deferential than this ideal requires. When the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted
a new rule like Kyllo, lower courts have applied it narrowly and usually limit its
217
scope to protecting the home. Kyllo is not viewed “as a symbolic endorsement
218
of broad privacy rights in new technologies.” Courts are not deviating from a
“relatively humble and deferential . . . attitude” in the area of the Fourth
219
Amendment. Rather than utilizing a forward-looking approach when adapting
rules to protect privacy rights inherent in the Fourth Amendment, courts seem
content to analogize emerging technologies to cigarette packages and the like,
220
allowing our privacy interest to shrink with each subsequent update.
D. Why the Task of Protecting Our Smartphones Best Lies with the Legislature
The Fourth Amendment attempts to strike a balance between legitimate law
221
enforcement goals and the privacy and autonomy of individuals. While courts
have drafted rules that served both of those Fourth Amendment goals when
technologies are stable, the legislature is better suited for developing rules to
222
govern areas of rapid change, something Justice Alito acknowledged in United
223
States v. Jones. One commentator illustrated this point using the example of
224
traffic stops. The issues posed by a traffic stop have remained constant for
decades—a passenger’s privacy interests in her automobile, the officer’s safety
concerns regarding weapons in the vehicle, and policy concerns about a driver’s
225
ability “to speed away” and “later dispose of the evidence.” Courts are able to
consider the effects of new rules with the benefit of familiar circumstances and a
226
long period of time for analysis. Through this process, courts developed stable
rules that allow officers to stop vehicles for any minor offense and search the

215. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 222–23 (1999).
216. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 835.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 837.
219. Id. at 838.
220. See supra Part III.B (explaining how emerging capabilities of smartphones necessitates treating
them differently than other objects analyzed under the Fourth Amendment).
221. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 861.
222. Id. at 861–62.
223. 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that “[i]n circumstances involving
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is
well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety
in a comprehensive way”) (citations omitted). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito in
concurring in the judgment in a case involving GPS tracking devices. Id. at 958.
224. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 862.
225. Id. at 863.
226. Id. at 863–64.
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vehicle and pat down the driver if the officer has reasonable suspicion the driver
227
or passenger has a weapon.
However, judges have difficulties when attempting to draft rules for a
228
shifting landscape. The recent SILA cases involving cell phones illustrate the
229
point. In Diaz, the court addressed the issue of a warrantless search of the text
230
message folder of the defendant’s cell phone. Although the technology was
231
available in 1993, the court did not address text messages and SILA until more
232
than a decade and a half later. In the meantime, cell phones and the interests
233
and concerns surrounding them changed greatly.
In Diaz, the court dismissed the defendant’s argument that cell phones should
234
be treated differently than cigarette packs because of their storage capacity. The
court noted the record lacked information on the storage capacity of the phone in
question and there was no reason to exempt all cell phones from warrantless
235
searches, “including those with limited storage capacities.”
But this
retrospective reasoning renders these judicially created rules obsolete as soon as
236
they are handed down.
The California Supreme Court’s stance might have made sense when police
237
searched the defendant’s phone in 2007. After all, in 2008, smartphones only
238
made up ten percent of the U.S. cell phone market. But recent statistics show a
vastly different landscape from when the officer thumbed through Gregory
239
Diaz’s text messages five years ago. In 2011, the number of smartphone users
240
in the United States jumped by 34 million to 95.8 million users and now
227. Id.
228. Id. at 858.
229. See California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513–14 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL
4530138 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority’s opinion, which deals with text
messages, also applies to smartphones that allow a person to carry more personal data in their pocket than ever
before).
230. Id. at 503–04.
231. Shawn McClain, History of Texting on Mobile Phones, EHOW.COM, http://www.ehow.com/about_
6507906_history-texting-mobile-phones.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
232. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 501.
233. See supra Part III.D (explaining why the legislature is better suited to create rules for emerging
technologies).
234. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 508.
235. Id.
236. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 861–62.
237. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 502.
238. Roger Entner, Smartphones to Overtake Feature Phones in U.S. by 2011, NIELSEN WIRE (Mar. 26,
2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/smartphones-to-overtake-feature-phones-in-u-s-by-2011/
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
239. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 502.
240. Phil Goldstein, CTIA: U.S. Smartphone Users Now 95.8 Million, FIERCE WIRELESS (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.fiercewireless.com/ctialive/story/ctia-us-smartphone-users-now-total-958-million/2011-1011 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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comprise forty-two percent of all mobile phone users in this county. Among the
twenty-four-to-thirty-eight-year-old demograpic, fifty-eight percent of mobile
242
users have a smartphone. What is more telling is how people are using all of
those smartphones. Eighty-seven percent of smartphone users access the Internet
from their phones, while twenty-five percent of users rely primarily on their
243
phones to access the Internet. The ubiquity of smartphones is also changing
244
behavior beyond mere browsing. For example, twenty-eight percent of
smartphone owners used their phones to scan product barcodes in 2010 to
245
compare prices or purchase items with their devices. Those numbers mean text
messaging is the tip of the privacy iceberg among what will soon be a majority of
246
smartphone users. Unlike a traffic stop—where the concerns and interests have
247
remained steady for decades —smartphones and their capabilities are ever
248
evolving. In 2007, a user’s privacy concerns might have been limited to text
messages, phone contacts, call histories, and photos. In 2013, those concerns
encompass users’ Internet browsing history, e-mails, purchases, bank history,
249
videos, past locations, friends, social media commentary . . . the list goes on.
250
Four years from now, who knows?
When technology develops rapidly, judges struggle to keep up. As one
commentator stated:
Courts lack the institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy
implications of new technologies they encounter. Judges cannot readily
understand how the technologies may develop, cannot easily appreciate
context, and often cannot even recognize whether the facts of the case

241. comScore Releases the “2012 Mobile Future in Focus” Report, COMSCORE (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2012/2/comScore_Releases_the_2012_Mobile_Future
_in_Focus_Report (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
242. Ryan Kim, 1/4 of Smartphone Users Rely on Their Device for Internet Access, GIGAOM (July 11,
2011), http://gigaom.com/2011/07/11/14-of-smartphone-users-rely-on-their-device-for-internet-access/ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing a recent study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project).
243. Id.
244. See infra notes 245–46 (detailing the new ways in which owners use their smartphones).
245. Compete Smartphone Intelligence Survey Shows Mobile Barcode Scanning Now Mainstream in
Retail, MARKETWIRE (Jan. 6, 2011, 10:57 ET), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/compete-smartphoneintelligence-survey-shows-mobile-barcode-scanning-now-mainstream-1376718.htm (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
246. See Keith Wagstaff, Nielsen: Majority of Mobile Subscribers Now Smartphone Owners, TIME (May
7, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/05/07/nielsen-majority-of-mobile-subscribers-now-smartphone-owners/
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining, as of 2012, more than fifty percent of cellular customers
use smartphones).
247. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 862.
248. Newman, supra note 29.
249. Id.; Cassavoy, supra note 27.
250. Abhijit Bangera, IBM: Mind Controlled Computers and Smartphones by 2017, GEEK TECH (Dec.
20, 2011), http://geektech.in/archives/6810 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (speculating that in 2017,
users might be able to control their smartphones with their minds).
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before them raise privacy implications that happen to be typical or
atypical. Judicially created rules also lack necessary flexibility; they
cannot change quickly and cannot test various regulatory approaches. As
a result, judicially created rules regulating government investigations
tend to become quickly outdated or uncertain as technology changes. The
context of legislative rule-creation offers significantly better prospects
for the generation of balanced, nuanced, and effective investigative rules
251
involving new technologies.
Balancing the Fourth Amendment issues of privacy and law enforcement
regarding smartphone development implicates new privacy interests that
252
continually impact the changing dynamic between officer and suspect. These
types of rapidly evolving policy considerations are best left to the legislature,
253
“not by lawyers skilled in reading Supreme Court opinions.”
IV. WHY THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE FAILED IN THE PAST AND HOW IT CAN
SUCCEED IN THE FUTURE
This Part details a previous legislative attempt to protect smartphones from
warrantless searches. It then explains why that previous attempt failed and how
to create a legislative coalition to ensure future success in this area.
A. The Life and Death of SB 914
Forty-six days after the California Supreme Court announced its decision in
254
255
Diaz, State Senator Mark Leno responded with SB 914. SB 914 noted that
more Californians use “portable electronic devises” every day that store vast
256
amounts of “personal and private information.” Because smartphones have
Internet access, that personal data accessible through user’s devices can be stored
257
on computers across the globe. The bill forbid police from conducting
warrantless searches of a suspect’s “portable electronic devices,” defined as “any
portable device that is capable of creating, receiving, accessing, or storing
258
electronic data or communications.” Senator Leno noted that absent an
immediate threat to police or public safety, police officers could only access the

251. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 211, at 858–59.
252. Id. at 864–65.
253. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 363 (1996).
254. 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL 4530138 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011).
255. SB 914, AROUND THE CAPITOL, http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/billtrack/text.html?bvid
=20110SB91498AMD (last visited July 3, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
256. S.B. 914, 2011 Cal. Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (vetoed).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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contents of a seized cell phone by obtaining a warrant.
stated:

259

Senator Leno further

The simple fact that technology allows us to store all this information in
our portable phones instead of our homes doesn’t give government the
260
right to view them at will. Such an intrusive search is a violation of
your privacy, and could allow authorities to incriminate you and others,
261
even if it is not related to your arrest.
SB 914 received support from the American Civil Liberties Union, the
California Newspaper Publishers Association, the California Broadcasters
Association, the California Public Defenders Association, the California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, the First Amendment Coalition, the Electronic
262
263
Frontier Foundation, and the endorsement of some commentators, as well. SB
264
914 cruised through the California Assembly (70–0) and Senate (28–9) and
265
landed on Governor Brown’s desk in September 2011.
The only organization opposed to SB 914 in the final bill analysis might be
266
the reason Diaz remains good law in California. The Peace Officers Research
Association of California (PORAC) opposed the bill, arguing that “[r]estricting
the authority of a peace officer to search an arrestee unduly restricts their ability
to apply the law, fight crime, discover evidence valuable to an investigation and
267
protect the citizens of California.” While Governor Brown said courts were

259. Press Release, Sen. Mark Leno, You and Your Smart Phone Have a Right to Privacy (July 12,
2011), available at http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/focus/outreach/sd03/sd03-ealert-20110712.asp (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 10 (Cal. 2011),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_cfa_20110621_140130_asm
_comm.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
263. See Peter Scheer, Urging Gov. Brown to Sign SB 914, CAL. COAST NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://calcoastnews.com/2011/09/urging-gov-brown-to-sign-sb-914/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(urging Gov. Brown to sign SB 914, while also acknowledging the sway law enforcement interests who
opposed the bill had with the governor); Editorial, Gov. Brown Should Sign Cellphone Search Law, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/08/opinion/la-ed-cellphone-20111008 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing the bill would not hamper law enforcement or threaten officers’ safety); Ryan
Singel, Gov. Brown: Sign Bill Outlawing Warrantless Smartphone Searches, WIRED MAG. (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/smartphone-warrant/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(predicting a veto by the governor even while advocating Brown sign off on SB 914).
264. Complete Bill History of SB 914, http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914
_bill_20120301_history (last visited July 4, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
265. Id.
266. See infra notes 271–77 and accompanying text (detailing PORAC’s significant impact on
California politics).
267. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 9 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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better suited to handle constitutional search-and-seizure issues, commentators
speculated PORAC and other law enforcement unions influenced the governor’s
269
decision to veto SB 914. Subsequently, the California Legislature did not
270
attempt to override of Governor Brown’s veto.
The law enforcement unions in general, and PORAC in particular, have
271
supported the governor in the past. PORAC recently gave $38,900 to Brown’s
campaign, while seven police unions donated at least $12,900 each to Brown, for
272
273
a total of $160,000 in campaign donations. PORAC boasts 64,000 members
and proclaims on its website,
[n]o other organization can claim the legislative victories that PORAC
has achieved. PORAC has the clout to tie up and/or kill legislative issues
that are detrimental to peace officers. Through its active involvement and
logical presentation of the facts, PORAC is rated as one of the most
274
effective lobbying groups in California.

268. Olivarez-Giles, supra note 2.
269. See Kravets, supra note 3 (asserting Gov. Brown’s veto solidified his standing with PORAC); see
also Bob Egelko, Leno May Introduce Cell Phone Bill Next Year, S.F. CHRON. (OCT. 12, 2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/11/BA551LGCD2.DTL (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (speculating that Senator Leno would have to satisfy “critical police groups as well as the
governor” if he hoped to avoid a future veto on SB 914’s successors); Steven Greenhut, Brown Shows His
Union Label, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/brown-322053union-bill.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that Governor Brown “puts the interest of
some of the most controversial unions . . . ahead of the rights of citizens”); Peter Scheer, Brown Caves to
Police, Vetoes Bill to Restrict Searches of Cell Phones, CAL COAST NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://calcoastnews.com/2011/10/brown-caves-to-police-vetoes-bill-to-restrict-searches-of-cellphones/ (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The most likely explanation for the veto is that Brown caved to the pressure
of law enforcement special interest groups. Their knee-jerk opposition to SB 914 was strong enough to
overcome the judgment of large bipartisan majorities in both the Senate and the Assembly. This outcome,
overriding the public will, raises the question whether police wield too much political power in California.”).
270. To override a veto, the California Legislature needs a two-thirds vote in each house within sixty
days of the veto. A Guide for Accessing California Legislative Information on the Internet, LEG. COUNS. STATE
CAL. (Jan. 2009), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/guide.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). However, the
legislature has not overridden a governor’s veto since 1979, and Senator Leno acknowledged, in reference to a
separate bill, that the legislature loses power by not exercising its veto-override authority. Republicans Fail in
Rare Attempt to Override Governor’s Veto, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
california-politics/2012/01/jerry-brown-republican-veto-override-fails.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). Indeed, the week after Governor Brown vetoed SB 914, Senator Leno was discussing reproposing the
bill in one year, not overriding the veto. Egelko, supra note 269. Because of the unwillingness or inability of the
California Legislature to override a governor’s veto, this Comment will proceed under the assumption that the
only path for a bill protecting cell phones from warrantless searches would be to avoid a veto.
271. See infra notes 272–75 (examining PORAC’s financial contributions to political candidates in
California).
272. Kravets, supra note 3.
273. PEACE OFFICERS RESEARCH ASS’N OF CAL., MEMBER SERVICES 5, available at http://porac.org/,
under the Membership Services tab (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
274. Legislation, PEACE OFFICERS RESEARCH ASS’N OF CAL., http://porac.org/political-action/
legislation/ (last visited July 3, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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A review of PORAC’s recent efforts shows that assertion to be accurate. From
2003 to 2010, PORAC invested $1.36 million in proposition campaigns and
275
donated another $1.36 million to political candidates. Ten of the thirteen
propositions PORAC supported ended in the result the organization sought, and
276
seventy-one percent of its candidate donations supported winners. The Center
on Juvenile and Criminal Justice concluded that PORAC is “a powerful lobbying
organization in California” that has used its spending power to “gain favor with
277
state candidates.” With specific regard to SB 914’s potential successors, one
reporter projected that Senator Leno will need to satisfy PORAC and its law
278
enforcement union brethren if the senator hopes to avoid another veto.
B. How to Win over the Unions and Still Protect Privacy
In considering whether to re-introduce SB 914 in the next legislative session,
Senator Mark Leno acknowledged his decision may depend on whether he could
279
satisfy unions like PORAC. With that goal in mind, the legislature should pass
a statute that allows warrantless searches of cell phones only in situations where
officers have a reasonable suspicion the cell phone contains evidence of the
crime for which the suspect is being arrested and the evidence could be destroyed
if police do not search the phone immediately.
280
I propose a statute with much the same language as SB 914. However, SB
914 would have eliminated SILA altogether as a means for an officer to
281
warrantlessly search a cell phone, which drew PORAC’s aforementioned
282
opposition. I propose amending section (a) of SB 914 to read:

275. SELENA TEJI, PROMOTING THE “GET TOUGH” CRIME CONTROL AGENDA: THE PEACE OFFICERS
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA (PORAC), CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1–3 (Nov.
2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/post/public/policy/porac/s/contribution/california/s/prison/crisis (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
276. Id. at 3–4.
277. Id. at 8.
278. Egelko, supra note 269.
279. Id.
280. SB 914 Bill Text, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/
sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). SB 914 proposed:
(a) The information contained in a portable electronic device shall not be subject to search by a
law enforcement officer incident to a lawful custodial arrest except pursuant to a warrant
issued by a duly authorized magistrate using the procedures established by this chapter.
(b) As used in this section, “portable electronic device” means any portable device that is capable
of creating, receiving, accessing, or storing electronic data or communications.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision (a), nothing in this section curtails law enforcement reliance
on established exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Id.
281. Id.
282. See supra Part IV.A (detailing PORAC’s opposition to SB 914).
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(a) The information contained in a portable electronic device shall not be
subject to search by a law enforcement officer incident to a lawful
custodial arrest, except:
i.

Pursuant to a warrant issued by a duly authorized magistrate using
the procedures established by this chapter, OR

ii. Pursuant to the search incident to lawful arrest doctrine, if the
arresting officer has reasonable suspicion the portable electronic
device contains evidence of the crime for which the suspect is
being arrested and the evidence could be destroyed if the officer
does not search the phone immediately. This exception is limited
to applications on the portable electronic device where an officer
reasonably believes evidence of the crime for which the suspect
was arrested exists.
This would return SILA searches of cell phones to the evidence preservation
283
justification of Chimel, while still recognizing the legitimate situations police
284
face in which the warrant requirement may hinder a police investigation.
Limiting the search to applications on the phone where an officer reasonably
believes the evidence exists prevents general warrant-style searches through a
285
smartphone’s contents. This rule will prevent police from fishing through a
suspect’s phone and should prevent any kind of search in traffic stops for moving
violations, driving under the influence, driving with a suspended license, and the
286
like, since cell phones would not reasonably contain evidence of those offenses.
The rule also still grants police enough flexibility to search cell phones for
evidence of a specific crime, and preserve that evidence, when officers have
reasonable suspicion the phone contains the evidence in question and an
exigency warrants an immediate search. It simultaneously addresses the evidence
287
preservation concerns of PORAC, while acknowledging the breadth of private
288
information a smartphone can contain. PORAC has compromised to support

283. See supra Part II.A. Note that PORAC did not cite officer safety as a reason for opposing SB 914,
just its effect on officers’ ability to “fight crime” and “discover evidence.” SENATE RULES COMMITTEE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 10 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
284. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 9 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
285. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761–63 (1969) (noting the Fourth Amendment was adopted to
prevent general warrant searches which placed almost no restrictions on government intrusion).
286. See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding an illegal
warrantless search of an automobile when the arrestee was apprehended for driving without a license because
the object of the search was not evidence of the crime for which the officer arrested the suspect).
287. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 914, at 10 (Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
288. See supra Part III.B.
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289

legislation it initially opposed when concessions are made for officers and for
politicians caving to public pressure when a PORAC-sponsored stance proved
290
untenable under the limelight of media scrutiny.
This proposed bill puts politicians in a spot where they would have to choose
between supporting legislation that addressed PORAC’s stated objectives and
continuing to oppose a bill that prevented general searches through users’
291
phones. Thus, in a case like Diaz, where the officer has reason to believe a
292
seized cell phone contains text messages related to an arrest for selling drugs
and that officer had reason to believe the evidence could be destroyed, he would
have the right to search the text message folder of the phone. In a case like
293
Notolli, the officer would need to reasonably believe the suspect was drunk, the
phone contained evidence of that intoxication, and the evidence could be lost if
the officer had to obtain a warrant before the officer could search the phone (a
search limited to the applications the officer believed contained the evidence).
Simply arresting someone for driving with a suspended license would no longer
294
give the officer carte blanche authority to search the arrestee’s phone.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have strayed from the original justifications of SILA and extended its
295
application to more situations and items. Consequently, cell phones have come
within the scope of SILA, and courts have been content to analogize them to
items like cigarette packs rather than acknowledging cell phones are inherently
296
different and deserve fresh analysis and a new rule. Where courts have failed,
legislatures can succeed by adopting more nuanced rules and finding the proper
297
balance between evolving technologies and important policy issues. In
California, the legislature’s rule would have to satisfy the law enforcement
289. George Skelton, The State Taking Some License with Language Might Save Gun Bill, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2001, at 6 (detailing PORAC’s support of a handgun permit bill that the organization opposed until
legislators carved out exceptions in the bill that exempted officers who had already received equivalent training
from taking the tests necessary to receive a handgun license).
290. John Diaz, Hiding Behind the Shield, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 2008, at G4 (noting politicians backing
away from a bill that would hide officer information, including salaries, from public when faced with the reality
existing law already covered the stated rationale of protecting undercover officers).
291. C.f. id. (mirroring the situation politicians faced in support of AB 1855 in 2008).
292. California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 502–03 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1231, 2011 WL
4530138 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011). It should be noted that in Diaz no such exigency was present to give the officer
reason to believe the text messages could be lost if the phone was not searched immediately. See id.
293. California v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 891 (Ct. App. 2011).
294. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
295. See supra Part II (detailing the history of the jurisprudence extending SILA to cell phones).
296. See supra Part II.D, Part III (discussing the current application of SILA to cell phones, regardless
of the technological advances).
297. See supra Part III.D (analyzing why the legislature is an effective way to protect the increasing
privacy concerns of smartphones).
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unions. What Governor Brown’s veto of SB 914 demonstrated is the legislature
299
needs a rule that takes into account the concerns of organizations like PORAC.
This Comment proposes a rule that attempts to strike a balance by allowing
warrantless searches of cell phones where the officers reasonably believe
evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested will be contained in
specific applications on the phone and the evidence will be lost if the officer does
not immediately search the phone. The rule prevents officers from generally
rummaging through cell phones to find any evidence of illegality, while still
taking into consideration law enforcement investigative needs. The rule strikes a
pragmatic balance between our expanding privacy concerns in an electronic age
and law enforcement’s need to fight crime committed with those devices.

298. See supra Part IV (providing the history of California’s legislative initiatives and the reason for
their failures).
299. Id.
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